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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper evaluates the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the transition from socialism 
to capitalism. Fixed-effects panel regressions indicate that FDI and domestic investment have an 
equal effect on growth in the first year of investment, but over time FDI is associated with 
greater growth than domestic investment. However, this positive impact of FDI turns out to be 
contingent upon the presence of a relatively well-functioning state in the host economy; in the 
absence of such a state, the net effect of FDI on economic development may be negative. All 
findings are robust in light of instrumental variable estimation, which is used to account for 
potential endogeneity problems.    
Foreign direct investment (FDI) – capital investment in one country by firms owned in a 
different country – is considered one of the most controversial elements of globalization.  
Characterizations of its role as a driving force of economic development range across the 
spectrum from conducive to obstructive, and scholars as well as policy-makers continue to pose 
questions regarding its implications for a country’s long-term welfare. Over the last thirty years, 
empirical studies have produced inconclusive and contradictory findings regarding the 
developmental benefits of FDI for developing economies, although some of the more recent 
work suggests that positive consequences outweigh potential negative externalities (Firebaugh 
1992, 1996; Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee 1998; De Soysa and Oneal 1999).  
The role of FDI has also been at the center of a debate over which public policies are most 
suitable for transforming the atrophied state-owned economies of the former socialist world into 
competitive market systems. Some scholars have claimed that countries which attracted large 
amounts of FDI were able to more easily overcome the challenges of rapid economic reform by 
privatizing state-held assets to foreign investors, and in doing so permitting efficiency gains, 
facilitating technology transfers, and improving access to world markets (e.g., Eyal, Szelényi, 
and Townsley 1998; King and Szelényi 2005). While a variety of case studies and small-N 
country comparisons confirm this theory (King 2000; King 2001a, 2001b; King and Váradi 
2002; Bandelj 2003; King and Sznajder 2006), other research contends that FDI has had 
primarily negative implications for countries, including the destruction of existing production 
networks, the promotion of low-wage, low-value-added manufacturing, and the permanent 
dependence on foreign economic actors (e.g., Bakos 1995; Matzner 1996; Ellingstad 1997; 
Andor and Summers 1998).    
The present article offers a systematic reevaluation of the developmental dynamics 
surrounding FDI, focusing on the postsocialist experience. Our empirical goals are threefold: We 
seek to (1) determine the impact of FDI on economic development in transition economies, (2) 
assess the relative performance of foreign and domestic investment over time, and (3) explore to 
what extent the effects of FDI are contingent on the institutional environment of the host nation. 
A central proposition of this paper is that foreign investment is not categorically associated with 
either positive or negative outcomes, but that its effects depend on the presence of a relatively 
well-functioning state.  
In order to test this hypothesis and to adjudicate between competing claims about benefits of 
FDI, we use a panel dataset of 31 transition economies, covering the period from 1989 to 2004.
1 
Unlike previous work that relied on case studies or cross-sectional methods, our analysis is able 
to capture both cross-country effects and over-time dynamics. The research design is 
strengthened by the fact that transition economies form a cohort. In breaking with their state-
socialist past almost simultaneously, they were collectively “new to the game” of capitalism, and 
subject to many of the same social, political, and economic challenges. Their subsequent 
trajectories, policies, and outcomes, however, were characterized by considerable variation, thus 
creating an unprecedented natural laboratory for social scientists. When investigating the effects 
of FDI, a cohort setup is advantageous insofar as it permits a significantly higher degree of 
comparability across cases than studies of abstract groups such as “developing countries” or 
“emerging markets,” whose constituent elements oftentimes share few common features. 
The remainder of this paper is structured into six parts: The first reviews the existing 
literature on the effects of FDI; the second outlines our analytical framework based on a 
neoclassical sociological understanding of capitalism; the third discusses our analytical methods;    
the fourth describes data and variables; the fifth presents the findings of our statistical analysis; 
finally, in the conclusion, we outline the theoretical and policy implications of our findings, and 
delineate avenues for future research. 
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
During the post-war era, a variety of theoretical explanations emerged to account for the 
persistent lack of economic development in large parts of the world. While these theories agreed 
in principle on the features of underdevelopment – low per capita income, inadequate health care 
and education systems, stark rural-urban differentials, dwindling levels of industrialization, and 
lack of public infrastructure, to name only a few – they differed markedly in their attribution of 
its causes. One cause that has been consistently contentious is the effect of contact between the 
advanced industrial economies and the less developed regions of the world. Two sets of theories 
merit particular attention in this regard: modernization theory and neoclassical economics on the 
one hand (e.g., Lewis 1948; Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Rostow 1960; McClelland 1964; Apter 
1965; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995), and dependency and world-systems theory on the other 
hand (e.g., Frank 1967; Galtung 1971; Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Landsburg 
1979; Borschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; O’Hearn 1989). 
Theories of modernization are grounded in the assumption that countries progress from 
traditionalism to modernity in stages. At each stage, new political, economic and social 
institutions emerge, allowing for more advanced economic activities. In their analyses of this 
process, modernization theorists have tended to be less concerned with the causes of 
underdevelopment than with obstacles to it, and attributed a lack of progress primarily to 
endogenous factors, while viewing exogenous influences as mostly positive. In the latter    
category, investment by multinational corporations ranks as a particularly virtuous influence. 
Since modernization theory assumes that there is essentially only one correct pathway toward 
development, theorists in this paradigm encourage underdeveloped regions to imitate the 
institutional forms and practices found in advanced industrial nations in order to accelerate their 
convergence with the developed world and attract investment from it. 
Neoclassical economics provides insight into the mechanisms that are driving this alleged 
convergence; it starts with the premise that growth in the stock of capital is the primary driver of 
economic expansion (Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Levine and Renelt 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995). In the context of underdeveloped countries, investment from abroad is thought to provide 
capital when domestic sources are not sufficient. Since underdeveloped countries are often 
characterized by a dearth of domestic capital, foreign investment has come to be acknowledged 
as a central vehicle by which these economies can catch up to the developed world. In addition to 
furthering the accumulation of capital, neoclassical economists expect the presence of foreign 
multinational firms to generate a variety of spillovers, including the transfer of technology and 
management skills, the creation of jobs, and the spread of productivity and efficiency into 
traditional sectors of the economy. 
Dependency and world-systems research fiercely contests these claims.
2 Scholars in these 
fields claim that endogenous factors play only a minor role in determining the trajectory of an 
underdeveloped nation, and instead point to the internal structure of an economy as being shaped 
primarily by exogenous forces, such as trade and foreign direct investment. They argue that the 
prosperity of advanced capitalist economies is contingent upon the continued exploitation of a 
group of peripheral countries; practices like foreign investment serve only to enrich the 
developed world while causing enduring detriment to poorer economies (Frank 1967; Galtung    
1971; Amin 1974; Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Landsburg 1979; Borschier and 
Chase-Dunn 1985; O’Hearn 1989). 
The dependency and world-systems literature has proposed a variety of mechanisms by 
which foreign investment may be harmful for its host economy. These include but are not limited 
to: various forms of surplus extraction – for instance, transfer pricing or excessive royalty 
payments – which harm domestic productivity and capital accumulation, thus exacerbating 
unequal exchange patterns within the world economy; predatory behavior of foreign 
multinational corporations against nascent or already successful domestic firms; manipulation of 
national economic policies through foreign firms which dominate the most dynamic sectors of 
the host economy; and alteration of domestic consumer preferences (Amin 1976; Evans 1985; 
Chang 1998). 
A disproportionate share of empirical studies has found that foreign investment has a 
detrimental impact on the economic performance of host countries, although some of these 
findings have subsequently been challenged. Bornschier, Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1978) 
assess the consequences of investment dependence, defined as the degree to which an economy 
is penetrated and controlled by foreign capital. Contrary to previous research, Bornschier, Chase-
Dunn and Rubinson measure the stock of foreign investment in host economies, as opposed to 
annual flows. Inflows of foreign capital, they argue, can promote economic development in the 
short-run due to capital formation and input acquisitions by foreign corporations, but the 
cumulative effects of foreign investment will likely produce a reduction of the growth rate over 
time. Based on a quantitative cross-country comparison, the authors confirm their hypothesis that 
inflows of foreign direct investment increase the relative rate of economic growth in the short-
term, while a growing stock of foreign direct investment dampens growth prospects in the long-   
term. Similar results and arguments were presented by Bornschier (1980), Dolan and Tomlin 
(1980), Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Marsh (1988), Kentor (1998), and Dixon and 
Boswell (1996). 
By contrast, Firebaugh (1992) finds that foreign investment markedly facilitates growth. He 
asserts that the investment dependence researchers have committed a logical fallacy in 
interpreting the coefficients generated by their regression models.
3 Accordingly, a reanalysis of 
their data using his own, corrected model reveals that foreign investment consistently promotes 
growth; however, Firebaugh also finds that foreign capital is “not as good” (116) as its 
homegrown counterpart. A later analysis by the same author (Firebaugh 1996) reports similar 
results. De Soysa and Oneal (1999) offer a reanalysis of Firebaugh’s (1992; 1996) and Dixon and 
Boswell’s (1996) studies, largely replicating Firebaugh’s findings. However, they disagree with 
his conclusion that foreign capital performs worse than domestic capital, claiming instead that 
foreign investment is more productive than capital from domestic sources. 
A large number of in-depth country studies have reported mixed results regarding the 
consequences of foreign investment. To name only a few, Chen, Chang and Zhang (1995) find 
that FDI in China during the post-1978 reform period has led to both economic development and 
increasing income inequality. Jansen (1995) concludes from a study of Thailand that foreign 
direct investment tends to have a positive effect on private investment and growth, but adversely 
affects a country’s balance of payments. Bradshaw, Kim and London (1993) show with time-
series data from Korea that, while trade resulting from the presence of foreign corporations has 
facilitated economic growth across the economy, the capital outflow associated with foreign 
direct investment has caused economic expansion to proceed at less than the country’s potential.    
Finally, some studies conclude that foreign direct investment has no effect on growth at all (Hein 
1992; Dutt 1997). 
The arguments put forth in the debate between modernization theory and neoclassical 
development economics on the one hand, and dependency and world-systems theory on the other 
hand, which focused on the experience of “Third World” countries, have resurfaced in academic 
debates on how to achieve a successful transition from socialism to capitalism. While 
increasingly few social scientists assert that all forms of exchange with advanced industrialized 
economies produce underdevelopment, widespread opposition to foreign investment remains, 
especially within the political arenas of less developed and late industrializing economies. 
Growing numbers of researchers have started to employ the concepts developed in the 
dependency and world-systems paradigms to question the developmental merits of foreign 
investment in the transition from socialism to capitalism. In line with previous work, they argue 
that foreign investment will promote the transfer of economic control and wealth to foreign 
agents, ultimately producing economic stagnation. Due to foreign ownership of the economy, the 
normal linkages that would develop among domestic business do not occur, and profits are 
exported out of the country. Ellingstad (1997), for instance, argues that foreign investment in 
Hungary is analogous to foreign investments in the Mexican Maquiladora system, by promoting 
“low-wage, low or medium skill, low value added manufacturing, with little hope for a 
meaningful upgrading of skills” (9; see also Andor and Summers 1998). Another line of criticism 
focuses on the destruction of domestic production networks by foreign investment. Matzner 
(1996) refers to this as “market-destroying” behavior that occurs when a foreign firm buys a 
domestic company, eliminates local production, and sells output produced abroad on the 
domestic market. Bakos (1995) adds that foreign investment exhibits a strong tendency to    
recreate and reinforce monopolies. Both of these positions are consistent with Inzlet’s (1994) and 
Bailey’s (1995) claims that foreign-owned firms cut R&D expenditures (see Gowan [1995], and 
Bailey, Sugden and Thomas [1998] for further examples). 
Proponents of modernization theory and neoclassical economics have taken an opposite 
stance. They argue that foreign investment allows postcommunist countries to modernize the 
Soviet-style industrial order. In particular, foreign investment is thought to help replace socialist 
property rights and, along with domestic privatization programs, transform existing state-owned 
enterprises into globally competitive firms. These dynamic firms, introduced into postcommunist 
markets through privatizations and green-field investments, then provide the principal engine for 
economic growth in the postcommunist context.  
Advocates argue that foreign direct investment provides a vast array of benefits to recipient 
firms and host economies. First, it introduces crucial knowledge, skills, and values in the form of 
superior Western management techniques, business ethics, entrepreneurial attitudes, labor 
intensity, and production techniques. Second, foreign investment allows for industrial upgrading 
by embedding firms into existing global research and development networks, thus promoting 
technology transfer. Third, it facilitates international trade by providing the invested firms with 
access to crucial Western markets. The ensuing economic growth, in turn, creates new 
employment opportunities and stimulates the demand for inputs from domestic suppliers. Fourth, 
foreign investment injects new, competitive firms into the economy, thus threatening existing 
monopoly structures (for Eastern Europe see Sachs 1993: 3; Sachs 1995; Svetlicic, Artisien and 
Rojec 1993: 10; Dunning 1993: 30; Mann 1991: 184; Csaki 1995: 108; Faur 1993: 204; Frydman 
and Rapaczynski 1994; Dobosiewicz 1992; Kozminiski 1993: 35). Many of these arguments 
closely mirror the imagery and logic of earlier modernization theories, as is evident from a quote    
by Dobosiewicz (1992): “Foreign investment and the operation of foreign enterprises can be 
likened to a battering-ram beating down many obstacles to the introduction of a free-market 
economy that for over forty years the old system has chosen to ignore” (xii). 
Some scholars have taken a less absolute stance on the issue by arguing that foreign direct 
investment allows countries to partially compensate for the problems created by rapid economic 
reforms, in particular, by promoting reindustrialization. Backed by financial capital, technology, 
expertise, and access to world markets of multinational corporations, domestic firms in non-
resource-based manufacturing are put in a position to restructure their operations and 
subsequently begin to export goods abroad without experiencing massive technological 
downgrading, sometimes leading to substantial upgrading (King 2001a, 2001b; King and Váradi 
2002; King 2002; King and Szelényi 2005; King and Sznajder 2006). 
 
 
A STATE-CENTERED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A central proposition of this paper is that foreign investment is not categorically associated with 
either positive or negative outcomes, but that its effects are contingent on a variety of domestic 
political and institutional factors, in particular, the presence of a relatively well-functioning state. 
This concern for the state goes back to Weber’s understanding of modern capitalism and his 
claim that state actions are a crucial factor in promoting and maintaining an environment 
conducive to rapid industrialization. In order to best serve the needs of modern capitalist firms, 
the state’s behavior must be predictable on the basis of formal rules of administration, a rational 
legal system, and accountable civil servants (Weber 1976, 1978; see also Collins [1980]). Absent 
such a state, Weber contends that “adventurous and speculative trading capitalism and all sorts of    
politically determined capitalisms are possible, but no rational enterprise under individual 
initiative, with fixed capital and certainty of calculations” (Weber 1976: 25). 
Social scientists have used Weber’s thesis – the claim that successful capitalist development 
requires not just markets but the presence of a strong, bureaucratic state – to account for the 
differential industrialization and development of various countries and regions (e.g., Evans 1985; 
Wade 1990; Evans and Rauch 1999). We propose to extend Weber’s notion to explaining the 
role of public institutions in the developmental processes surrounding FDI. The idea is that in 
countries whose governments exhibit low levels of state capacity and fail to enforce the rules and 
regulations necessary for the operation of a functioning capitalist economy, the contribution of 
foreign investment to economic development will be considerably smaller or even negative. 
Such an outcome could manifest itself via a variety of mechanisms. First, states that fail to 
uphold a predictable legal and administrative system may deter investments that have the 
potential to create linkages with the domestic economy; such investments typically involve high 
fixed costs, yet foreign investors tend to shy away from such commitments in situations of 
perceived political risk. Second, a weak state may be unable to regulate foreign investment in a 
manner that is beneficial to national welfare. Many scholars claim that states which experienced 
periods of foreign investment-led growth in the past did so precisely because they adopted a 
restrictive policy regime toward foreign corporations, for instance, by requiring them to use local 
inputs or reinvest profits in the domestic economy.
4 Third, states that are unable to enforce 
property rights protection or contract security might incentivize foreign firms to recoup their 
investments as quickly as possible by repatriating all profits, instead of investing them in the host 
economy. Finally, weak, non-bureaucratic states are oftentimes characterized by widespread 
corruption, as patron-client networks begin to permeate their organization, and the separation of    
office-holder and office becomes indistinct. In such an environment, rent-seeking politicians and 
domestic elites might allow foreign corporations to influence political and economic decisions in 
exchange for bribes. If foreign corporations and domestic actors form an alliance of this kind, the 
state’s capacity to act autonomously and enforce laws and regulations may evaporate, giving rise 
to unchecked and potentially deleterious behavior of foreign investors. In the following, we 
outline a methodology that allows for testing the proposed argument, that the developmental 





We adopt a cross-sectional time-series design to study the effects of FDI on economic 
development, due to the superior analytical leverage such designs achieve in addressing matters 
of causal inference, as compared to traditional cross-sectional approaches.
5 In particular, panel 
designs offer advantages in dealing with the issue of unobservable characteristics that plague 
such inference. Consider the following model: 
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This setup covers i units and t points in time. It contains a term θi for unobserved unit effects, a 
term θt for unobserved time effects, and a zero-mean transitory error term εit that varies over time 
and units, is mean-independent from θi, θt, and the explanatory variables in all periods, and, 
conditional on the explanatory variables, θi, and θi, has constant variance and is uncorrelated over 
time and across units. The term wkit refers to a set of time-varying explanatory variables, while zip 
signifies a set of time-constant explanatory variables that vary only across units. Finally, xit is the 
causal variable of interest.    
The central issue in estimating Equation 1 is whether the unobserved unit effects θi and time 
effects θt ought to be treated as random or fixed. This choice depends on whether the θi and θt  
are correlated with the explanatory variables; if θi and θt are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
covariates, one can treat them as random effects and estimate the model using a generalized least 
squares (GLS) approach. However, in the present context, as well as in many other sociological 
applications, this assumption is not reasonable. Various unit-specific effects that are constant or 
nearly constant over time but hard to measure are likely to be present. Firebaugh and Beck 
(1994) list a number of such effects that cross-national researchers should consider: a country’s 
location, topography, climate, mineral resources, type and quality of soil, access to seaports, 
history, culture, economic system, political system, legal system, city system, religious 
composition, and relationship with neighbors. There is reason to believe that at least some of 
these attributes will be quite pronounced in the postcommunist context; hence, using an 
estimation procedure that does not take them into consideration will likely produce biased 
results. Likewise, failure to account for time-specific fixed effects – in this case, idiosyncratic 
historical events that affect all countries simultaneously at a given point in time – would result in 
biased estimates. 
In addition to providing a substantive justification of why unobserved unit and time effects 
ought to be treated as fixed, one can carry out a statistical test to adjudicate between the fixed-
effects and random effects estimators. Hausman (1978) formulated a procedure to test the null 
hypothesis that the unit and time effects and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated. Small 
values of the Hausman statistic fail to reject the null hypothesis and suggest GLS estimation of a 
random effects model on efficiency grounds; large values favor within-estimation of a fixed-
effects model.    
Fixed-effects transformation of Equation 1, when estimated by least squares, yields the 
following estimator:  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i it i it ki kit
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The fixed-effects estimator produces correct standard errors and test statistics, provided the 
errors εit have a constant variance and are not serially correlated, thus producing efficient 
estimates. If the assumption of constant error variance is violated, Huber-White standard errors 
can be employed to correct for heteroskedasticity. If first-order serial correlation is present, a 
method developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) can be used as a corrective. 
In the present application, it is furthermore necessary to address the issue of endogeneity. As 
noted above, it is assumed that the error term εit in Equation 1 is mean-independent from the 
explanatory variables. Violation of this assumption leads to biased and inefficient estimators, 
regardless of whether unobserved unit effects are treated as fixed or random. Within the context 
of our research project, such a violation would be present if variations in FDI were partially 
influenced by idiosyncratic elements of the response variable (i.e., economic development). 
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation is one powerful technique of dealing with endogeneity. It 
involves identifying one or more variables that are correlated with the explanatory variable but 
not with the error term εit. A good instrument is one that is “correlated with the endogenous 
regressor for reasons the researcher can verify and explain, but uncorrelated with the outcome 
variable for reasons beyond its effect on the endogenous regressor” (Angrist and Krueger 1999: 
8). Applying instrumental variable estimation to Equation 2 then yields the fixed-effects 
instrumental variable (FE-IV) estimator, which attempts to correct for endogeneity while still 
treating unobserved unit and time effects as fixed.  This technique has become mandatory in    
many economics and political science journals, although we consider it more of a useful 
robustness test.
6 
To illustrate the instrumental variable approach, consider the following simplified example 
involving the relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer. Suppose that alcohol 
consumption was also a cause of cancer. If one were to use the price of cigarettes as an 
instrument for smoking (assuming that people smoke more when cigarettes are cheaper, and that 
the price of cigarettes does not affect cancer except via increased smoking), one could get an 
estimate of the effect of smoking on cancer, purging the influence of drinking (and potential 
other unobserved confounders) on cancer.   
We propose using foreign aid as an instrument for FDI, given the strong evidence that 
increased aid is associated with higher FDI in the postcommunist context (Bandelj 2008: 123), 
and the by now extensive literature showing that foreign aid does not promote growth, especially 
in the postcommunist context. Bandelj’s paper demonstrates that FDI flows are socially and 
politically embedded. She argues that aid leads to greater levels of FDI because it facilitates the 
exchange of information, and “in the postsocialist period, such information may concern 
privatization-related investment opportunities” (15). Aid also “shows political patronage by 
donors of recipient countries, and… these political connections shape international economic 
exchange” (ibid.). Specifically, aid might inspire confidence in investors that the donating 
government is concerned with the long-term development of the recipient nation, and will pay 
attention to and perhaps help enforce property rights and contract security for foreign firms. 
The reasons for the failure of aid are many. Critics argue that aid fails to create the proper 
incentives to promote growth, as it leads to a dependent relationship in which local actors lack 
internally driven motivation. That is, they do not actually “own” the projects funded by foreign    
aid, and thus do not implement them well. The counterproductive conditions imposed on loans 
are also major culprits (see the extensive discussion in David Ellerman’s Helping People Help 
Themselves [2006]). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, foreign aid almost never addresses 
the structural causes of poverty (Easterly 2003, 2006; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2003). 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
 
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset on the social, economic, and political development of 
31 transition economies. These data are drawn from a number of principal sources: (1) the World 
Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005), an annual compendium of economic, 
social, environmental, business, and technology indicators for 152 countries with populations of 
more than one million people; (2) the Foreign Direct Investment Database (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2005), a directory of worldwide FDI flows 
and directions; (3) the European Health for All Database (World Health Organization [WHO] 
Regional Office Europe 2005), a catalog of international health and mortality statistics; (4) the 
TransMONEE Database, a resource detailing social and economic trends in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Baltics (UNICEF Innocenti Research 
Centre 2005); and (5) the International Development Statistics Database, a compendium of 
foreign aid transactions and other transnational resource flows (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD] 2006). In addition, some variables were generated on the 
basis of historical records, including those provided by the various editions of the Transition 
Report (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] 1996; 1999; 2000).
7  
 
Economic Development. The response variable of our analysis, economic development, is 
typically measured using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and we follow this practice.
8    
We purposely refrain from using annual growth rates, as is customary among many economists; 
doing so would be inappropriate here since the concept of interest is overall economic 
development (i.e., modernization or de-modernization), which can be quite different from 
average annual growth.
9 A logarithmic transformation is applied to GDP per capita in order to 
correct for a substantially skewed distribution. GDP data were retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005). 
 
Foreign Direct Investment. Foreign direct investment is measured as net annual investment 
inflows, expressed as a percentage of GDP in order to account for variations in the size of the 
host economy. All FDI data are drawn from the United Nations Foreign Direct Investment 
Database (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2005). 
 
Domestic Investment. Domestic investment is calculated by subtracting foreign investment 
from gross capital formation
10 – a quantity formerly known as gross domestic investment – and 
then expressing the results as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Military Conflict. War ranks among the most severe disruptions the economy and should 
therefore be included in an analytical model predicting development. We employ a measure of 
average conflict magnitude, ranging from 1 (least severe) to 5 (most severe), that covers ethnic 
conflicts, revolutionary wars, and incidents of genocide. The data are drawn from a database on 
internal wars and failures of governance that is maintained by the Political Instability Task Force 
(Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2005). 
    
Political Rights. Measures of political rights have been identified as positive predictors of 
economic development (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Levine and Renelt 1992), and are 
therefore included in the present analysis. We use the Freedom House index of political rights 
(Freedom House 2005), a widely-used measure of the quality of democratic institutions. The 
index is coded from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), even though we have reversed this coding 
scheme to render regression coefficients more readily interpretable. Despite previous findings of 
a positive relationship between political rights and GDP per capita, the observed complexities in 
the relationship between democratic rule and economic development in the transition context 
(see Kurtz and Barnes 2002) lead us to be agnostic as to the association between the two in our 
analysis. 
 
Education. Past research has found human capital to be a strong determinant of economic 
development (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Levine and Renelt 1992). We employ gross higher 
education enrollment rates for the population aged 19 to 24 as a measure of human capital, and 
expect to find a positive effect on economic development. The relevant data were retrieved from 
the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005) and the TransMONEE 
Database (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005). 
 
Foreign Trade. Foreign trade, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is introduced as a measure 
of economic openness to account for potential equilibrium differences between open and closed 
economies. In accordance with most theories of economics development, we expect a positive 
association between trade and economic development. Trade data were drawn from the World 
Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005).    
 
Government Consumption. Government consumption, expressed as a percentage of GDP, has 
been found to exhibit a negative influence on economic development, a fact that economists have 
linked to the distorting effects of taxation and government expenditure programs (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995; Levine and Renelt 1992). We include the measure in our analysis but remain 
agnostic with regard to its effects in the context of transition economies. The data source is the 
World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005). 
 
Agrarian Class Structure. The relative size of a country’s rural population is introduced as a 
control for cross-country differences in class composition. Gerschenkron (1962) suggest 
advantages of lateness: less developed countries grow faster because they can combine new 
techniques with low wages. In the long run, we therefore expect higher levels of rural population 
to be associated with greater economic development (i.e., the a lagged, positive effect). We are, 
however, agnostic with respect to the contemporaneous effects of agrarian class structure that is 
captured by our variable. The data for this measure were drawn from the World Development 
Indicators Database (World Bank 2005).  
 
Mass privatization programs. Mass privatization programs were among the most far-
reaching structural reforms introduced in transition economies. These were innovative and 
radical programs that sought to jump-start a private economy when there were no investors 
interested in privatizing companies. They accomplished this by distributing vouchers to the 
population that could be redeemed for shares in enterprises, thus creating a type of “people’s 
capitalism”. We define mass privatization programs as privatization efforts encompassing more    
than 25% of a country’s medium-sized and large enterprises. Mass privatization programs have 
been shown to induce firm failure and deindustrialization, thus exerting a negative influence on 
economic development (Hamm and King 2005). The present analysis includes a time-variant 
categorical variable, indicating whether a given country has adopted a mass privatization 
program, which was coded on the basis of the EBRD Transition Report series (1996; 1999; 
2000). 
 
Inflation. Inflation has been found to negatively impact economic development (Barro 1995). 
For the present analysis, we have computed a five-year moving average of inflation, taking into 
account the fact that various postcommunist economies experienced periods of hyperinflation 
during the 1990s. The underlying data source is the World Development Indicators Database 
(World Bank 2005).  
 
Europe Agreement. A time-variant categorical variable is used to indicate whether a country 
has signed a so-called Europe Agreement, an association agreement that aims to prepare the 
associated state for accession to the European Union. These agreements invoke criteria such as 
respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy. Since most of the 
countries that signed such an agreement also received large amounts of FDI and experienced 
considerable increases in the level of economic development, it is necessary to account for the 
possibility that these countries would have experienced positive growth trajectories regardless of 
the amount of FDI they received, simply because their governments pursued policies geared 
towards satisfying the Europe Agreement, which also led to higher economic growth. 
    
Life Expectancy. Based on recent findings that demographic indicators such as life 
expectancy and mortality exhibit significant influences on economic development (e.g., Bloom 
and Williamson 1998), we include male life expectancy at birth as a further control variable. 
Based on the assumption that an economy with a healthy labor force will be more productive, we 
expect that life expectancy will display a positive effect on economic development. The relevant 
data were retrieved from the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2005) and 
the TransMONEE Database (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2005). 
 
Internal and External Liberalization. In order take into account the differential “progress” of 
a country’s transition from socialism to capitalism, we employ two indicators developed by the 
EBRD (1996; 1999; 2000), which measure the internal and external liberalization of a country on 
an annual basis. The former concept refers to the liberalization of domestic prices and trade, 
whereas the latter entails the liberalization of foreign trade and currency convertibility. In their 
original form, the EBRD indicators range from 1 to 4+, where 4+ indicates that a country’s 
structural characteristics are comparable to those found in an advanced capitalist economy, while 
1 corresponds to the conditions in an unreformed, centrally planned economy with dominant 
state ownership. In order to facilitate statistical analysis, we have linearized the transition 
indicators by assigning a value of +1/3 to a “+” sign, and a value of -1/3 to a “-” sign. Note that 
the transition indicators are merely used as a control for economic reforms; they should not be 
seen as a way of assessing the viability or timing of those reform measures, and, in fact, doing so 
would be misleading due to an in-built positive bias in the indicators (King et al. 2008). Data on 
the transition indicators is unavailable for the East Asian economies in our sample. 
    
State capacity. Past research has relied on a variety of concepts to measure the institutional 
capacity of states, ranging from approximate indicators – such as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP 
– to direct qualitative assessments – like the quality of bureaucracy index that is published 
annually by Political Risk Services (PRS) in a publication called the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). Unfortunately, no such measure is available in time-series format for the 
countries covered by our analysis. We therefore follow a suggestion by Popov (2001) and use a 
country’s murder rate as a proxy measure for its government’s ability to enforce laws and 
regulations, uphold stability, and maintain the institutions necessary for a functioning capitalist 
economy.
11 
Cross-sectional correlations suggest that the proposed variable may indeed be an appropriate 
measure of state capacity in the postcommunist context. A measure from the 1999/2000 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (EBRD 2000) – a survey of over 4000 firms in 
22 transition economies – that indicates the degree to which the state is expected to uphold 
contract and property rights, shows a -0.61 correlation with the murder rate. Using the transition 
economies included in the 2000 World Business Environment Survey (World Bank 2000), the 
same measure correlates with the murder rate at -0.65. An ICRG index capturing the extent to 
which a country was characterized by law and order in 1999 (PRS 2005) demonstrates a -0.75 
correlation with the murder rate. Another ICRG indicator (PRS 2005), measuring the 
institutional strength and quality of a country’s bureaucracy in 2004, correlates with the murder 
rate at -0.51. Finally, an ICRG measure assessing the degree of corruption in a country’s political 
system in 2004 (PRS 2005) is correlated with the murder rate at -0.58. To be sure, homicide rates 
might be related to state-capacity, but in a way that makes them a conservative measure. Weak 
states are more likely than strong states to not record homicides. This variable will therefore have    
a conservative bias, under-recording weakness of weak states. This strengthens the case for the 
use of this variable.   
We measure the murder rate as the number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants, using data 
from the European Health for All Database (WHO Regional Office Europe 2005).
12 To measure 
the extent to which the effect of foreign direct investment on economic development is 
contingent upon the presence of a strong state, we introduce a multiplicative interaction term of 
FDI and the murder rate, which we expect to have a negative coefficient. Note that data on 
homicides are unfortunately unavailable for the East Asian economies in our sample (China, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia), as well as for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Foreign aid. Identifying an instrument for FDI when the latter is endogenous is not an easy 
task, given that many of the variable’s correlates (e.g., rate of growth, political stability, quality 
of the bureaucracy) tend to have a direct relationship with a country’s economic development. 
We use the amount of foreign aid received by a country as an instrument for FDI (see discussion 
above). The required data were drawn from the International Development Statistics Database 





The purpose of our empirical investigation is threefold. We seek to (1) determine the impact of 
FDI on economic development in transition economies, (2) assess the relative performance of 
foreign and domestic investment over time, and (3) explore the extent to which the effect of FDI 
is contingent upon the presence of an effective state. The results of our fixed-effects panel 
regressions indicate that FDI has a positive effect on economic development, even though the    
magnitude of this effect is contingent on the quality of the state. Moreover, our analysis reveals 
that over time foreign investment has a positive impact on economic development, which is not 
observed for the domestic variety. These findings are robust in light of instrumental variable 
estimations. 
Table 1 shows severeal interesting results regarding the relationship between FDI and 
economic development. Model 1.1 demonstrates that FDI has a positive effect on development 
after controlling for a variety of factors, including domestic investment, military conflict, 
political rights, human capital, life expectancy, foreign trade, government consumption, class 
structure, and inflation. Specifically, the coefficient for FDI indicates that a 1% increase in FDI 
is associated with a 0.67% increase in GDP per capita.
13 The observed coefficient for domestic 
investment is identical in this specification, predicting a 0.67% increase in GDP for every 
additional percent of domestic investment. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Models 1.2 to 1.5 assess whether the above findings are robust when additional factors 
affecting economic development are taken into consideration. Regression 1.2 includes a variable 
indicating whether a country has signed a Europe Agreement; as outlined above, countries that 
signed such an agreement may have adopted a variety of reforms geared towards meeting EU 
accession criteria, which could have resulted in higher economic development, regardless of the 
amount of FDI received. Given that the coefficient for FDI remains unchanged when the Europe 
Agreement variable is added to the model, this possibility can be discounted. Model 1.3 adds the 
two liberalization indicators, and thus seeks to account for the considerable structural economic 
reforms that were implemented by many transition governments, and Model 1.4 adds to this 
specification the Europe Agreement measure from Model 1.2. As noted earlier, the EBRD    
liberalization indicators are not available for the East Asian economies in the sample; Models 1.3 
and 1.4 should therefore be evaluated against Model 1.5, which also excludes these countries but 
is otherwise identical to Model 1.1. It is evident from the results that the magnitude of the FDI 
coefficient is only marginally smaller when the East Asian economies are excluded – a 1% 
increase in FDI is equivalent to a 0.65% increase in GDP per capita, as opposed to a 0.67% 
increase for the full sample. In addition, this coefficient is robust to the introduction of the 
liberalization indicators (Model 1.3) and Europe Agreement measure (Model 1.4), with a 
reduction in the effect of only 0.05%. Note that, while the coefficient of domestic investment is 
larger than that of FDI for some of the above specifications, in no case is this difference 
statistically significant. 
Model 1.6 is an exact replication of Model 1.1, except that China is excluded from the 
sample. China is unusual among the transition economies insofar as it began implementing 
economic reforms as early as 1978, whereas the other transition economies did not do so until 
the late 1980s or early 1990s; as it turns out, removing China from the sample leaves the 
coefficients observed in Model 1.1 virtually unchanged, thus attesting to the robustness of the 
findings. 
Overall, the results reported in Table 1 indicate that the presence of foreign capital in an 
economy is associated with higher levels of economic development, a finding that is robust in 
light of a variety of controls. Although FDI is the central focus of this analysis, two of the control 
variables merit closer inspection. First, it is noteworthy that the political rights measure does not 
exhibit a statistically significant relationship with GDP per capita, suggesting that democratic 
institutions do not feature among the main catalysts of economic development in the transition 
context. Second, foreign trade consistently shows a negative relationship with GDP per capita, a    
finding that persists if the total population is added as a measure of country size (not reported). 
This seems to indicate that economic openness is not necessarily a desirable feature for 
economies undergoing rapid economic transformation. 
The regressions reported in Table 2 assess the effects of FDI over time, as well as the relative 
performance of FDI and domestic investment. Each model contains a lagged value of FDI 
inflows and the corresponding lagged value of domestic investment. As the number of lags is 
increased, the coefficient of FDI first declines and then increases again, whereas that of domestic 
investment consistently declines. The difference in coefficient magnitude for FDI and domestic 
investment is statistically significant for lags of four years and higher. More importantly, the 
coefficient for domestic investment ceases to be significant beginning with a two-year lag 
(Model 2.2), whereas that of FDI, after turning insignificant for the two-year and three-year lags 
(Models 2.2 and 2.3), becomes significant again in the four-year and five-year lag specifications 
(Models 2.4 and 2.5). These findings remain largely unchanged if Models 2.1 to 2.4 are re-
estimated using the restricted sample of Model 2.5. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The findings from Table 2 suggest that whether a given investment dollar comes from a 
foreign or domestic source makes a difference from the standpoint of economic development in 
postcommunist countries. FDI outperforms – or is at least statistically indistinguishable from – 
domestic investment in all specifications. In addition, while both FDI and domestic investment 
cease to have a statistically significant effect beginning with a two-year lag, the coefficient for 
FDI turns significant again for lags of four years and higher. There are a number of plausible 
explanations for why FDI would exhibit such a lasting impact on economic development. 
Foreign-invested firms might attract their foreign suppliers to follow them from abroad after    
some time. The effect might also reflect the behavior of foreign-invested enterprises that start to 
export locally manufactured products back abroad. A further explanation could be that, over 
time, foreign-invested businesses develop a variety of linkages with the domestic economy that 
ultimately lead to higher economic development. The present dataset does not permit us to 
adjudicate between these different explanations, but it is likely that one or several of them 
account for the persistent developmental benefits of FDI. 
We now move on to address one of the central proposition of this paper, namely, that the 
positive effects of FDI on economic development are contingent upon the presence of a 
relatively well-functioning state, which is able to preserve law and order, enforce property rights, 
and generally create an environment that is hospitable to capitalist activity. In order to test this 
proposition, the murder rate is introduced as a measure of declining state capacity, and then 
multiplicatively interacted with FDI.
14 
The results of Regression 3.1 show that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that the developmental benefits of FDI decline as state 
capacity weakens. Specifically, the coefficients in Model 3.1 imply a threshold level of declining 
state capacity, at which the positive effects of FDI are fully absorbed by the negative 
consequences of having a weak state. For a country whose FDI inflows amount to 1% of its 
GDP, this threshold level corresponds to a murder rate of 26.5. This is about the level of 
homicides found in Africa, South and Central America – those regions in the world virtually all 
comparativists agree have the lowest state capacity.  
The following two cases illustrate this logic: Russia’s FDI in 2003 amounted to 1.85% of its 
GDP, while its murder rate was 27.8, implying that the net effect of FDI was equivalent to a 
reduction of 0.47% in GDP per capita, not taking into account the effects of other variables in the    
model. Compare this finding to Poland, which received only marginally more FDI during that 
year (1.96% of GDP) but had a murder rate of 1.5; in this case, the net effect of FDI 
corresponded to an increase in GDP per capita of 1.53%.
15 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates this finding graphically. The greatest economic development was 
experienced by countries with the highest foreign investment and lowest incidence of homicide, 
whereas the lowest level of economic development is found in economies with the highest 
murder rates and lowest reception of FDI. Moreover, within each investment category, an 
increase in the murder rate – which is equivalent to a decrease in state capacity – is associated 
with considerably lower levels of economic development. Finally, the figure demonstrates that 
the returns to foreign investment decrease as the murder rate increases.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
To further assess the validity of these results, Regressions 3.2 to 3.4 take into account 
whether a country signed a Europe agreement (Model 3.2) or took steps to liberalize its domestic 
economy and foreign trade regime (Model 3.3). In each case, and when both controls are entered 
together (Model 3.4), the coefficients for FDI and the interaction term remain largely identical to 
those reported in Model 3.1, thus indicating a robust finding. 
There are a number of potential mechanisms by which FDI might display a negative effect on 
economic development in countries with weak governments. For instance, such governments 
might not be able to exercise sufficient control over the behavior of multinational enterprises, 
failing to prevent the latter from setting up low-wage, low-value-added manufacturing facilities 
that do little or nothing to benefit the local economy, while at the same time forcing domestic 
competitors out of the market. Likewise, weak or corrupt governments might allow foreign    
enterprises to exert an influence on domestic economic policy-making, causing the government 
to make decisions that benefit the activity of foreign-invested firms but are otherwise harmful to 
the economy. 
Table 4 reports the regression coefficients from instrumental variable regressions that seek to 
account for potential endogeneity problems with regard to FDI. Models 4.1 to 4.4 replicate the 
regressions reported in Table 1, whereas Models 4.5 to 4.8 correspond to the regressions from 
Table 3. For the first set of models, the estimated coefficients for FDI are somewhat larger for 
the instrumental variable estimation, yet their directionality is the same as for ordinary least-
squares estimation. A similar situation is observed for the second set of models, where the 
magnitudes of the FDI coefficient and the interaction term are larger under instrumental variable 
estimation, while their directionality is the same. In terms of the threshold level at which the net 
effect of FDI becomes negative, Model 4.5 implies a murder rate of about 43.6, as opposed to the 
value of 26.5 observed in Model 3.1. Overall, the instrumental variable regressions provide 
support for the substantive findings obtained using the fixed-effects ordinary least-squares 
estimator, given that the direction of the effects in question is the same. The differences in effect 
magnitude, however, suggest that the observed results may be partially affected by endogeneity, 
which suppresses the advantage of foreign over domestic ownership.  Indeed, in the non-IV 
models, FDI demonstrates its superiority in the lagged models, while IV estimation indicates an 
advantage even during the first year.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The results of our study suggest that foreign direct investment can act as a catalyst for economic 
development during periods of transition and economic uncertainty. In particular, the findings    
lend support to the claim that countries in the postcommunist world that attracted FDI were able 
to overcome the challenges posed by rapid economic transformation with greater ease. 
Results regarding the relative performance of foreign and domestic investment over time 
indicate that the observed benefits are largely unique to investment originating from abroad, a 
fact which is likely due to the various spillover effects of foreign direct investment discussed 
earlier, such as growing linkages with the domestic economy. This finding thus confirms that a 
relationship observed in other contexts (e.g., De Soysa and Oneal 1999) also holds true in the 
postcommunist world.  
Crucially, the study confirms our hypothesis that the benefits associated with FDI are 
contingent upon the presence of a relatively well-functioning state. While this finding is 
generally in line with the work of scholars arguing for the importance of a developmentally 
active state in promoting economic growth (Weber 1976, 1978; Evans 1985; Wade 1990; Evans 
and Rauch 1999; Chibber 2002), it illuminates a more specific, previously unobserved dynamic 
regarding FDI: that the presence of foreign corporations in an economy is only desirable when 
there is an institutionally capable state. It is therefore critical for countries hoping to rely on 
foreign investment as an engine of economic development to take simultaneous measures that 
prevent the erosion of state capacity. In addition to improving the efficacy of FDI, it is likely that 
such measures would also attract more of it. Since the effects of FDI might actually be negative 
in very weak states, development policy should arguably be geared toward improving the 
functioning and capacity of the state, and not toward creating incentives to attract foreign 
investment. In fact, if a weak state spends to attract foreign investment (e.g., via tax holidays, 
tariff exemptions, and permissive regulatory environments) it might be doubly counter-
productive because the loss of revenue will contribute to a further weakening of the state, and the    
resulting FDI might be deleterious. This conclusion seems furthermore plausible because foreign 
firms that are attracted to low tax rates and a permissive regulatory environment are likely to be 
exactly the type of foreign capital which a poor country does not need (i.e. focused on low value-
added sectors and prone to questionable corporate behavior).   
Critics might question our findings by interrogating the validity of murder rates as a measure 
of state capacity. They could point out that the variable is correlated with other measures of state 
capacity at only about 0.6. While this correlation might be somewhat weak, it is crucial to keep 
in mind that existing subjective measures of state capacity are particularly poor variables, 
characterized by large amounts of coder and respondent bias (see the seminal articles by Kurtz 
and Schrank [2007a; 2007b]). Indeed, a concept like “state capacity” captures the performance of 
many different state institutions, so designing an overall score, based on a small number of 
subjective survey questionnaires filled in by businessmen and other “experts”, is bound to be an 
extremely imprecise affair. The resulting variable will inevitably be of questionable validity. 
We believe that a measure like murder rates, especially when used in a fixed-effects 
framework that factors out differences in the social construction of these variables (to the extent 
that they are constructed similarly within different nation states), has far greater validity than any 
subjective measure. Conceptually, it undoubtedly fails to capture all areas of state capacity.  
However, it almost certainly does capture one of the basic functions of the state: its monopoly on 
legitimate violence in the territory under its control. High murder rates imply that a state is 
failing at one of its elementary tasks. It also means there is a general environment of lawlessness. 
Since our theorized mechanism expects opportunistic and illegal behavior by investors in the 
absence of a rule-enforcing state, a variable that clearly captures the enforcement of laws seems 
appropriate.    
To be completely clear, we are not claiming that murder rates capture everything sociologists 
mean by the term “state capacity,” but we do think it represents an important aspect of this 
concept. It is also a useful measure for comparative purposes, because, unlike other indicators of 
state capacity, it is available across both countries and years for the postcommunist world. 
Despite its limitations, we therefore think it is reasonable to treat this variable as an imperfect but 
nonetheless practical measure of state capacity. In general, we believe sociologists should spend 
more time developing other “objective” measures (meaning not based on subjective surveys of 
economic elites) of state capacity, or, better yet, objective measures of specific components of 
state capacity.       
Overall, our results corroborate the findings of existing micro-level research that is based on 
quantitative and qualitative studies at the firm-level. Research in Central Eastern Europe, the 
region most notable for its maintenance of state capacity during the transition, has shown that 
foreign-invested firms are considerably more dynamic than their domestically-owned 
counterparts. An extensive empirical literature confirms this notion.
16 Critics of FDI argue that 
these micro-level findings are inconclusive, since the macro-level story might differ 
substantially, and this is undoubtedly a possibility. One could visit foreign-owned firms that are 
busily capturing large market shares in Western Europe, yet fail to observe the collapse of 
domestic firms that have lost their contracts to these foreign firms, which prefer to use their own 
suppliers from abroad.   
Our own findings are inconsistent with this critique, and thus corroborate and support the 
micro-studies. We feel that empirical evidence is increasingly highlighting the virtues of FDI, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe where lawful societies and reasonably well-functioning 
states have emerged. This is not to argue that all the evidence is in, and the debate on FDI is    
settled.  We hope that this article will open up new avenues of empirical investigation, focusing 
on interactions between FDI and state and social structure, as well as sector-specific effects of 
FDI, which have thus far been neglected in empirical studies.   
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Table 1.  Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions of Economic Development on FDI and Control Variables. 
 
Variable  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
†  1.6
§ 
FDI inflow  0.0067 0.0067 0.0062 0.0060 0.0065 0.0065 
  (3.77)** (3.73)** (3.61)** (3.50)** (3.63)** (3.74)** 
Domestic investment  0.0067 0.0067 0.0068 0.0067 0.0066 0.0072 
  (5.70)** (5.72)** (5.90)** (5.88)** (5.61)** (6.36)** 
Political rights  -0.0090 -0.0143 0.0080  0.0013  0.0079  -0.0036 
  (0.9) (1.34)  (0.8) (0.12)  (0.77)  (0.38) 
Education  0.0035 0.0030 0.0045 0.0037 0.0042 0.0033 
  (3.01)** (2.47)*  (3.90)** (3.10)** (3.53)** (2.97)** 
Life expectancy  0.0394 0.0397 0.0257 0.0259 0.0285 0.0387 
  (5.32)** (5.37)** (3.50)** (3.54)** (3.75)** (5.38)** 
Foreign trade  -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0014 
  (5.03)** (4.80)** (4.77)** (4.45)** (5.79)** (4.64)** 
Gov. consumption  -0.0015 -0.002  0.0005  -0.0002 0.0003  -0.0011 
  (0.66) (0.85) (0.22) (0.10) (0.11) (0.47) 
Agrarian class structure  -0.0474 -0.0479 -0.0270 -0.0267 -0.0268 -0.0317 
  (8.45)** (8.54)** (3.88)** (3.86)** (3.86)** (4.88)** 
Military conflict  0.0048 0.0048 0.0114 0.0113 0.0083 0.0098 
  (0.41) (0.41) (0.98) (0.98) (0.7)  (0.83) 
Mass privatization program  -0.0269 -0.0232 -0.0239 -0.0176 -0.0460 -0.0256 
  (0.72) (0.62) (0.62) (0.46) (1.25) (0.71) 
Inflation  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
  (0.21) (0.03) (0.89) (0.52) (0.59) (0.24) 
Europe Agreement  - 0.0478  - 0.0698  - - 
   (1.37)   (2.03)*    
Internal liberalization  - - -0.0898 -0.0855 - - 
    (4.83)**  (4.59)**    
External liberalization  - - 0.0233 0.0193 - - 
    (1.28)  (1.06)    
Constant  7.8064 7.8042 8.0985 8.0869 7.8274 7.1631 
  (14.30)** (14.32)** (14.36)** (14.42)** (13.49)** (12.86)** 
Observations  (512)  404 404 335 335 335 388 
Number of countries (31)  31  31  25  25  25  30 
R-squared  0.71 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.70 
Notes:  Absolute value of t statistics (two-sided tests) in parentheses 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
  † Excludes East Asia 
  § Excludes China 
    
Table 2.  Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions of Economic Development on Lagged FDI and Control 
Variables. 
 
Variable  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
£  2.5
£ 
FDI inflow (1-yr lag)  0.0063  - - - - 
  ( 2 . 9 9 ) * *       
Domestic investment (1-yr lag)  0.0046  - - - - 
  ( 4 . 1 0 ) * *       
FDI inflow (2-yr lag)  - 0.0025  - - - 
   ( 1 . 0 7 )      
Domestic investment (2-yr lag)  - 0.0015  - - - 
   ( 1 . 4 4 )      
FDI inflow (3-yr lag)  - - 0.0016  - - 
    ( 0 . 6 9 )     
Domestic investment (3-yr lag)  - - 0.0002  - - 
    ( 0 . 1 6 )     
FDI inflow (4-yr lag)  - - - 0.0063  - 
     ( 2 . 8 0 ) * *    
Domestic investment (4-yr lag)  - - - -0.0005  - 
     ( 0 . 5 3 )    
FDI inflow (5-yr lag)  - - - - 0.0103 
      ( 5 . 0 0 ) * *  
Domestic investment (5-yr lag)  - - - - -0.0006 
      ( 0 . 7 4 )  
Political rights  0.0004 0.0088 0.0077 -0.0026  -0.0075 
  (0.04) (0.83) (0.72) (0.25) (0.77) 
Education  0.0039 0.0043 0.0045 0.0036 0.0025 
  (3.36)** (3.88)** (4.11)** (3.46)** (2.55)* 
Life expectancy  0.0387 0.0349 0.0187 0.0190 0.0042 
 (5.24)**  (4.82)**  (2.45)*  (2.31)*  (0.54) 
Foreign trade  -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.001  -0.0001 
  (5.95)** (5.78)** (5.20)** (2.56)*  (0.13) 
Gov. consumption  -0.0041 -0.0005 0.0015  -0.0001 0.0004 
  (1.70) (0.19) (0.60) (0.05) (0.16) 
Agrarian class structure  -0.0457 -0.0378 -0.0308 -0.0218 -0.0124 
  (8.22)** (6.75)** (5.30)** (3.73)** (2.13)* 
Military conflict  0.0141 0.0054 -0.0163  -0.0228  -0.0282 
  (1.19) (0.46) (1.38) (1.91) (2.52)* 
Mass privatization program  -0.0572 -0.1156 -0.1240 -0.1498 -0.3605 
  (1.47)  (2.95)** (2.78)** (2.81)** (4.08)** 
Inflation  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.06) (0.62) (0.51) (2.19)*  (2.94)** 
Constant  7.9373 7.9035 8.6006 8.1062 8.5884 
  (14.50)** (14.76)** (15.91)** (14.10)** (15.82)** 
Observations  (512)  396 376 351 323 293 
Number  of  countries  (31)  31 31 31 31 31 
R-squared  0.71 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.82 
Notes:  Absolute value of t statistics (two-sided tests) in parentheses 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
  £ Difference between FDI and domestic investment coefficients is statistically significant   
Table 3.  Fixed-Effects Panel Regressions of Economic Development on FDI, State Capacity, and 
Control Variables. 
 
Variable  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
FDI inflow  0.0087 0.0082 0.0090 0.0087 
  (2.42)* (2.30)* (2.64)**  (2.55)* 
Domestic investment  0.0073 0.0073 0.0076 0.0076 
  (6.24)** (6.26)** (6.80)** (6.78)** 
Political rights  0.0176 0.0109 0.0149 0.0107 
  (1.83) (1.08) (1.64) (1.11) 
Education  0.0077 0.0069 0.0080 0.0074 
  (6.19)** (5.24)** (6.76)** (5.90)** 
Foreign trade  -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0016 
  (6.48)** (6.09)** (5.29)** (5.06)** 
Gov. consumption  -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0015 
  (0.56) (0.86) (0.49) (0.69) 
Agrarian class structure  -0.0336 -0.0329 -0.0344 -0.0337 
  (4.39)** (4.31)** (4.64)** (4.54)** 
Military conflict  0.0005 0.0008 0.0060 0.0059 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.51) (0.50) 
Mass privatization program  -0.0541 -0.0500 -0.0347 -0.0312 
  (1.58) (1.46) (0.98) (0.88) 
Inflation  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
  (1.30) (1.05) (1.80) (1.58) 
Declining state capacity  0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.45) (0.51) (0.61) (0.64) 
FDI × declining state capacity  -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 
  (2.12)* (2.05)* (2.36)* (2.30)* 
Europe Agreement  - 0.0676  - 0.0450 
   (2.00)*   (1.39) 
Internal liberalization  - - -0.0978  -0.0950 
    (5.64)**  (5.45)** 
External liberalization  - - 0.0375  0.0347 
    (2.19)*  (2.02)* 
Constant  10.0249 10.0055 10.1138 10.0935 
  (27.66)** (27.76)** (29.23)** (29.19)** 
Observations  (512)  308 308 308 308 
Number  of  countries  (31)  25 25 25 25 
R-squared  0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 
Notes:  Absolute value of t statistics (two-sided tests) in parentheses 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01   
Table 4.  Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variable Regressions of Economic Development on FDI, State Capacity, and Control Variables. 
 
Variable  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 
FDI inflow  0.0446 0.0507 0.0923 0.1112 0.0784 0.0880 0.0968 0.1111 
  (2.07)* (1.96)* (2.23)* (2.11)* (2.67)**  (2.52)* (2.60)**  (2.30)* 
Domestic investment  0.0158 0.0172 0.0261 0.0306 0.0122 0.0126 0.0118 0.0125 
  (2.81)** (2.58)** (2.60)** (2.18)*  (5.19)** (4.88)** (4.39)** (3.96)** 
Political rights  -0.0319 -0.0248 -0.0373 -0.0277 -0.0463 -0.0449 -0.0561 -0.0569 
  (2.32)*  (1.65) (1.25) (0.85) (2.03)*  (1.81) (1.96) (1.72) 
Education  0.0076 0.0083 0.0116 0.0133 0.0102 0.0107 0.0127 0.0134 
  (5.80)** (5.14)** (4.21)** (3.64)** (8.00)** (7.59)** (7.94)** (7.20)** 
Life expectancy  0.0272  0.0234  -0.005  -0.0166  - - - - 
  (1.60) (1.19) (0.17) (0.42)        
Foreign trade  -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0013 
  (1.62) (1.57) (0.60) (0.54) (2.68)**  (2.62)**  (1.85) (1.75) 
Gov. consumption  0.0022 0.0033 0.0095 0.0132 -0.0013  -0.0006  -0.0025  -0.0017 
  (0.43) (0.58) (1.07) (1.16) (0.35) (0.14) (0.57) (0.35) 
Agrarian class structure  -0.0501 -0.0506 -0.0225 -0.0248 -0.0142 -0.0143 -0.0175 -0.0178 
  (8.00)**  (7.66)**  (1.32) (1.27) (1.03) (0.98) (1.14) (1.06) 
Military conflict  -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0081 -0.0086 -0.0036 -0.0030 -0.0092 -0.0082 
  (0.17) (0.11) (0.22) (0.20) (0.16) (0.12) (0.38) (0.31) 
Mass privatization program  -0.0799 -0.0709 0.0339  0.0552  -0.04  -0.0208 0.0432  0.0647 
  (1.86) (1.53) (0.35) (0.48) (0.68) (0.30) (0.51) (0.61) 
Inflation  <0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.91) (1.04) (1.01) (1.04) (1.54) (1.67) (1.06) (1.23) 
Europe Agreement  - -0.0718  - -0.1211  - -0.0605  - -0.073 
   (1.27)   (1.17)   (1.13)   (1.08) 
Internal liberalization  - - -0.0307  -0.0341  - - -0.0820  -0.0924 
    (0.75)  (0.71)    (2.28)*  (2.20)* 
External liberalization  - - -0.0865  -0.0888  - - -0.0041  0.0057 
    (1.66)  (1.45)    (0.16)  (0.19) 
Declining state capacity  - - - - 0.0088  0.0098  0.0108  0.0124 
      (1.90)  (1.83)  (1.81)  (1.68) 
FDI × declining state capacity  - - - - -0.0070  -0.0078  -0.0086  -0.0098 
      (2.60)**  (2.45)*  (2.52)*  (2.24)* 
Observations  (512)  392 392 323 323 296 296 296 296 
Number  of  countries  (32)  31 31 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Notes:  Absolute value of t statistics (two-sided tests) in parentheses 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01   
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.  The Relationship between FDI, Economic Development, and State Capacity. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 These 31 countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Cambodia, China (PRC), Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and 
Vietnam. 
2 Note that we use the terms dependency theory and world-systems theory interchangeably. 
Strictly speaking, this representation is inaccurate, as world-systems research attempts to account 
for a far broader set of social and economic phenomena than dependency theory. Significantly, 
world-systems scholars claim that economic development is not a process involving relatively 
autonomous nation states; rather, it must be understood exclusively in light of a global capitalist 
system and the political and economic forces that operate within it (Wallerstein 1974). With 
respect to foreign investment and the behavior of multinational corporations, however, 
dependency theory and world-systems theory reach very similar conclusions, justifying their 
present treatment as one field of study. 
3 Dependency researchers identified a negative coefficient for stock of FDI and inferred a 
dependency effect. However, as Firebaugh points out, capital stock is the denominator in their 
investment rate equation; thus, the greater the stock, the lower the investment rate, for a given 
level of new investment. Firebaugh therefore concludes that a negative coefficient in fact shows 
a beneficial impact, not a harmful effect. 
4 For instance, Wade (1990) and Chang (1998) make this argument with regard to the 
developmental trajectories of Taiwan and Korea, respectively. 
5 The following discussion draws heavily on work by Halaby (2004) and Wooldridge (2002). For 
better readability, specific references are not always provided. 
6 It is important to note that an instrumental variable estimator is less efficient than the 
corresponding least squares estimator in a model with uncorrelated errors. For this reason, it is 
advisable to test whether endogeneity is present and IV estimation is necessary. One can specify 
a Hausman test to this end, testing the hypothesis that the explanatory variable of interest is 
uncorrelated with the time-varying error term. If all the explanatory variables are exogenous, 
then the FE-IV and fixed-effects least squares parameter estimates will be similar and both 
would be consistent. If the two estimation procedures yield substantially different results, the 
fixed-effects estimator is likely inconsistent due to endogeneity. 
7 Cross-national quantitative studies are frequently plagued by quality-of-data issues, especially 
when variables are drawn from multiple different sources. The present analysis makes a strong 
effort to avoid this pitfall by only employing measures that, in the authors’ opinion, derive from 
reliable sources and accurately operationalize the desired concepts. 
8 Specifically, we measure GDP per capita in constant/real dollars and on PPP terms, to account 
for fluctuations in prices over time and in purchasing power across countries, respectively. 
9 Using annual rates is also statistically inappropriate for the postcommunist context, because the 
steeper the economic decline of a given country during the early years of the transition (the 
transformational recession), the higher its subsequent short-run (i.e., annual) growth rates, for the 
economy starts out at a lower base level. 
10 The data source for gross capital formation is the World Development Indicators Database 
(World Bank 2005). 
50    
50 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 This choice may seem counterintuitive at first, given that the United States of America, for 
one, is known for both its strong government and its high murder rate. However, if one were to 
define a functioning state as one that is not entirely captured by the actors it is supposedly 
regulating, the United States would score considerably lower on state capacity measures than, 
say, Western or Northern Europe (Domhoff 2005). In addition, the “extensive” power (Mann 
1986) of the state in those areas in the US with very high murder rates, such as inner-cities, is 
arguable very low. 
12 To the extent that these data are unreliable, they are likely to make our tests a conservative 
one, as countries with high violent crime and murder rates can be expected to underreport rather 
than exaggerate these figures. 
13 In regressions where the response variable is log-transformed, coefficients of the explanatory 
variables can be interpreted roughly as percentage changes when multiplied by 100; however, for 
all in-text interpretations, we use the following, more accurate transformation: 100×(e
β-1). 
14 Note that due to a correlation of -0.72 between the murder rate and life expectancy, the latter 
variable is excluded from the state capacity regressions in order to avoid potential 
multicollinearity problems. 
15 Note that the coefficient for the murder rate is negative and statistically significant if the 
interaction term is omitted (not reported). 
16 For example, King and Váradi (2002) examined 59 firm-level case studies in Hungary for 
evidence of 18 competing mechanisms linking FDI either to beneficial or detrimental economic 
outcomes. They concluded that, despite evidence of deleterious effects, these were far 
outweighed by the positive effects. These case study findings also correspond to firm-level 
regressions on two large random samples of firms in Hungary, which found that foreign firms 
outperformed private domestic ones by roughly 100% across a variety of restructuring indicators 
(King 2000). Similar qualitative and quantitative findings exist for Poland – although here the 
magnitude of the advantage of foreign ownership was even greater, at about 300% across 
indicators (King 2002, King and Sznajder 2006). 